Similar Search Results

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - 2002

conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514018

Contract adjustment under uncertainty

Holden, Helge (contributor); Holden, Lars (contributor); … - 2005

Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to the other, in exchange for an exogenous service. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally require an adjustment of the contract payment, involving adjustment costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002856667

Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect

Itō, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka - 2011

Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240848

Towards a theory of trade finance

Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim - 2011

Shipping goods internationally is risky and takes time. To allocate risk and to finance the time gap between production and sale, a range of payment contracts is utilized. I study the optimal choice between these payment contracts considering one shot transactions, repeated transactions and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011800

Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts

MacLeod, William Bentley (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003364208

Insurance and incentives in sharecropping

Braido, Luis H. B. - 2003

This essay surveys some recent empirical works about sharecropping. The basic theoretical trade-offs are discussed in the introduction. Section 1 discusses the empirical research on resource allocation. This section is divided in two subsections: one studying the effects of tenure stability on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011404325

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440

Flexible life annuities

Direr, Alexis (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003620158

Shocks to bank lending, risk-taking, securitization, and their role for US business cycle fluctuations

Peersman, Gert; Wagner, Wolf - 2014

Shocks to bank lending, risk-taking and securitization activities that are orthogonal to real economy and monetary policy innovations account for more than 30 percent of U.S. output variation. The dynamic effects, however, depend on the type of shock. Expansionary securitization shocks lead to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257361

Self-fulfilling credit cycles

Azariadēs, Kōstas; Kaas, Leo; Wen, Yi - 2015

In U.S. data 1981-2012, unsecured firm credit moves procyclically and tends to lead GDP, while secured firm credit is … acyclical; similarly, shocks to unsecured firm credit explain a far larger fraction of output fluctuations than shocks to … secured credit. In this paper we develop a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model in which unsecured firm credit arises …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503469