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The ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange economies with and without indivisibilities
Forges, Françoise (contributor) - 2006
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d'Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301240
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Second-degree moral hazard in a real-world credence goods market
Balafoutas, Loukas; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2013 - This version: 16 October 2013
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693
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Vertical product differentiation when quality is unobservable to buyers : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Industrial Organisation, March 2003
Orosel, Gerhard O.; Zauner, Klaus G. - 2004
. After purchase the true quality of the good is revealed with positive probability. To provide firms with incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450700
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Information, asymmetric incentives, or withholding? : understanding the self-enforcement of value-added tax
Waseem, Mazhar - 2019
During the period 1996-2000, the coverage of VAT in Pakistan rose by twenty times in terms of the number of firms in the tax net and by ten times in terms of the volume of transactions subject to it. This paper leverages this staggered introduction of VAT in the country to estimate its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012031140
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Reelection threshold contracts in politics
Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440
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Antidumping as strategic trade policy under asymmetric information
Matschke, Xenia; Schöttner, Anja - 2009
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807867
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Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity
Manzano Tovar, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - 2010
We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994517
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A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - 2011
We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)'s 'anticipatory equilibrium' by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of competitors'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011830
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Endogenous public information and welfare
Vives, Xavier - 2011
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832
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Bargaining and conflict with up-front investments : how power asymmetries matter
Schaller, Zachary; Skaperdas, Stergios - 2019
We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012156576