Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 4,127
Cover Image
Corporate deductibility provisions and managerial incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2013
findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227267
Cover Image
A theory of tax avoidance : managerial incentives for tax planning in a multi-task principal-agent model
Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - 2014
We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010367166
Cover Image
Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting
Khalil, Fahad (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor);  … - 2005
We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003113311
Cover Image
Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
Cover Image
The efficiency costs of dividend taxation with managerial firms : presented at CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics, April 2015
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2015
The paper analyzes the efficiency costs of dividend taxation in an effort-based corporate agency model in which non-verifiable managerial effort enhances taxable profits. We show that investment changes following a rise in dividend taxes might not be sufficient to infer the efficiency cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374208
Cover Image
Mergers, investment decisions and internal organisation
Banal-Estañol, Albert; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - 2003
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507904
Cover Image
Corporate taxation and corporate governance
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - 2009
behavior is however crucially influenced by diverging interests between shareholders and managers. We set up an agency model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923146
Cover Image
The effects of a bonus tax on manager compensation and welfare
Radulescu, Doina - 2010
managers between countries whereas in the second scenario relocation possibilities exist. Our findings show that the effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965889
Cover Image
Management incentives under formula apportionment : tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Martini, Jan T.; Niemann, Rainer; Simons, Dirk - 2014
compensation to managers in low-tax jurisdictions, if payroll enters the FA formula. Managers in high-tax jurisdictions face the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383849
Cover Image
Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective : the role of stock grants
Hili, Amal; Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo Van - 2016
We analyze the optimal contract between a risk-averse manager and the initial shareholders in a two-period model where the manager's investment effort, carried out in period 1, and her current effort, carried out in period 2, both impact the second-period profit, so that it may be difficult to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538964