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Reforming an institutional culture of corruption : a model of motivated agents and collective reputation
Valasek, Justin Mattias - 2015
into the mission-oriented or private sector with motivated agents who also value the collective reputation of their place … high-reputation, low-wage equilibrium and a low-reputation, high-wage equilibrium, which raises the question of how an … from a low-reputation to a high-reputation steady state: Importantly, the effect of wages on motivation depend on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011384510
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Reputation or reciprocity? : an experimental investigation
Gächter, Simon; Falk, Armin - 2001
Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long-term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398911
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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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The roots of cooperation
Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; … - 2021 - This version: 10 June 2021
young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547006
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The roots of cooperation
Bašić, Zvonimir; Bindra, Parampreet Christopher; … - 2021
We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine pre-registered hypotheses about which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment – emerges earliest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012668493
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Disguising lies : image concerns and partial lying in cheating games
Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk - 2017
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130
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I care what you think : social image concerns and the strategic revelation of past pro-social behavior
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2019
other people, even though a favorable reputation has no immediate material benefits. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966892
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Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model
Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009
We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806727
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Strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary authorities in a multi-country new-Keynesian model of a monetary union
Michalak, Tomasz; Engwerda, Jacob Christiaan; Plasmans, … - 2009
In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807838
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Antidumping as strategic trade policy under asymmetric information
Matschke, Xenia; Schöttner, Anja - 2009
This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807867