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Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship networks and company value in Italy (1998-2007)
Drago, Carlo; Millo, Francesco; Ricciuti, Roberto; … - 2011
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the structure of interlocking directorship networks and to the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and performance. We use a unique dataset made of corporate governance variables related to the board size and interlocking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009693
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Labor in the boardroom
Jäger, Simon; Schoefer, Benjamin; Heining, Jörg - 2019
study a reform in Germany that abruptly abolished this mandate for certain firms incorporated after August 1994 but locked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138860
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Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2013
countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199703
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Volatility and resilience of democratic public-good provision
Gersbach, Hans; Pitsuwan, Fikri; Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori - 2024
coalition with the agents who most desire, or least desire, the public good, and we may observe 'strange bedfellow' coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500614
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Who lobbies whom? : special interests and hired guns
Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas - 2018
We model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries. We show that special interests affected by policy issues that frequently receive high political salience lobby policymakers directly, while those that rarely receive high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011933912
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Repeated lobbying by commercial lobbyists and special interests
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - 2016
Using a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444131
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Interest groups and government spending in Italy, 1876 - 1913
Fiorino, Nadia; Ricciuti, Roberto - 2009
In the last two decades of the XIX century Italy became an industrial country. Historians maintain that this process was affected by the action of some interest groups that pursued both state protection from competition and specific public expenditure programs. Starting from the economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871940
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Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2010
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090
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Technological determinants of the group-size paradox
Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - 2011
The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011374
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A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups
Brandauer, Stefan (contributor);  … - 2006
We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003300999