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Consider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011565652
Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferable-utility cooperative game. When the concerned agents are risk averse, there is a core imputation given by means of shadow prices on state-dependent claims. Like in finance, a risk can hardly be evaluated merely by its inherent statistical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409137
countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199703
coalition with the agents who most desire, or least desire, the public good, and we may observe 'strange bedfellow' coalitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500614
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974150
repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003598571
distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003983187
; coalition formation ; endogenous institutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490611
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659