We study loans from banking and non-banking lenders to different groups of borrowers in order to unveil significant differences on how those respond to a shock and evaluate possible alternative explanations for such differences. The objective is to gain insights useful to explain the loan...

In this paper we develop a multi-sector model of firms pricing behaviour under imperfect competition. We allow for the fact that some goods sold will be for final consumption, while others will be used as intermediate goods in further production. We assume that price setters are constrained by...

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank to undercapitalise and finance overly risky business projects. To counter this market failure, national governments have imposed solvency constraints on banks. However, these...

We address the question of how lending market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt finance. It is shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards...

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design...

This paper discusses the role of secret versus public reserve prices when bidders’ valuations depend positively on the seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is disclosed after the highest bid has been reached. The...

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

This paper develops an algorithm that enables to solve macroeconomic models with Rotemberg pricing and imperfect common knowledge. Under the concept of imperfect common knowledge, Rotemberg pricing requires the solution algorithm to take prices explicitly into account. The state space includes...

We use an original monthly dataset of 131 individual euro area banks to examine the effectiveness and transmission mechanism of the Eurosystem's credit support policies since the start of the crisis. First, we show that these policies have indeed been succesful in stimulating the credit flow of...