Showing 1 - 10 of 365
relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment, where a news source decides if and how much information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009580771
We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these, we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649766
Based on data from a comprehensive benchmarking study on buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we show that more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment by suppliers and better part quality - but also with more competition among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026390
can be withdrawn after observation of competitors' contract offers. We show that an equilibrium always exists where … consumers obtain their respective Wilson-Miyazaki-Spence (WMS) contract. Jointly profit-making contracts can also be sustained … entry. -- casymmetric information ; competitive insurance market ; contract withdrawal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011830
Asymmetric information can distort market outcomes. I study how the online disclosure of information affects consumers' behavior and firms' incentives to upgrade product quality in markets where information is traditionally limited. I first build a model of consumer search with firms' endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013285520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003497568
that RPRs may be part of a relational contract, communicating private information from manufacturer to retailer that is … indispensable for maximizing joint surplus. We show that this contract is self-enforcing if the retailer's profit is independent of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965874
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689581
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315945