Output-based allocations (OBAs) are typically used in emission trading schemes to mitigate leakage in sectors at risk. Recent work has shown they may also help to stabilize prices in markets subject to supply and demand shocks. We extend previous work to simultaneously include both leakage and...

Should public assets such as infrastructure, education, and the environment earn the same return as private investments? The long-term nature of public investments provides commitment to current preferences, which justifies lower than private returns for time-inconsistent decision markers. An...

Climate is a persistent asset, bar none: changes in climate-related stocks have consequences spanning over centuries or possibly millennia to the future. To reconcile the discounting of such far-distant impacts and realism of the shorter-term decisions, we consider hyperbolic time-preferences in...

World income grows fast without verifiable climate-change impacts on the economy. The growth spell can end if climate impacts turn real but this can take decades to learn. We develop a tractable stochastic climate-economy model with a hidden-state impact process to evaluate the contributions of...

We consider a model of cake-eating with private information. The model captures phenomena such as trust and "security of supply" in resource-use relationships. It also predicts supply shocks as an equilibrium phenomenon: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal resource scarcity too...

Policies affecting the cost of energy use provide correct incentives for technology choices only if there is a market reward for energy efficiency. We provide clean evidence for market efficiency by considering how heating technologies capitalize into house values using detailed Finnish register...

Subsidies to renewable energy are costly and contentious. We estimate the reduction in prices that follows from the subsidized entry of wind power in the Nordic electricity market. A relatively small-scale entry of renewables leads to a large-scale transfer of surplus from the incumbent...

It is tricky to design local regulations on global externalities, especially so if firms are mobile. We show that when costs and outside options are firms' private information, the threat of firm relocation leads to local regulations that are stricter, not looser. This result is general and...

This paper develops a mechanism design approach to study externalities and re-distribution. The mechanism screens individuals’ social weights to strike a balance among broad distributional objectives, incentives to work, and incentives to reduce externalities. The welfare-optimal allocation...