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This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301085
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923234
In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good. For the case when all individuals have identical preferences in this paper a simple formula is derived that describes the proportion of all income...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011508069
using graph theory. This sufficient condition allows us to use the replacement function approach of Cornes and Hartley (2007 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011853293
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)'s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai's measure captures well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362381
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003641693
We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012696938
We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish others. In particular, we disentangle the decision to be a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864590
Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender's objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker's objective is to destroy a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405199
Theoretical and experimental studies of noncooperative games increasingly recognize Nash equilibrium as a limiting outcome of players repeated interaction. This note, while sharing that view, illustrates and advocates combined use of convex optimization and differential equations, the purpose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408978