This paper examines the effect that endangered species regulation has on natural resource development. Specifically, we use data from competitive auctions to estimate the effect that land-use regulation protecting endangered caribou in the Canadian province of Alberta has on the price producers...

In second price internet auctions with a fixed end time, such as those on eBay, many bidders snipe , i.e., they submit their bids in the closing minutes or seconds of an auction. Late bids of this sort are much less frequent in auctions that are automatically extended if a bid is submitted very...

This paper considers bidder behaviour in the United Kingdom s UMTS spectrum auction. Evidence is reviewed which shows that some bidders in this auction did not bid straightforwardly in accordance with fixed valuations of the licenses. We go on to consider more speculative hypotheses about...

We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure problem that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...

When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of low...

This paper studies various options to support allowance prices in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), such as adjusting the cap, an auction reserve price, and fixed and variable carbon taxes in addition to EU ETS. We use a dynamic computable general equilibrium model that explicitly allows...

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

Auctions of government bonds are the main allotment method used by the Treasury of advanced economies. Previous research has found that auctions have an influence on the market yield days before they take place, and underpricing is usually spotted when their outcome is compared with...

We scrutinize the scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities by using the topical example of a firm acquisition. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction...