The net present value of costs and benefits from a pay-as-you-go social security system are negative for young people and positive for the elderly. If people all vote their financial selfinterest, there will be a pivotal age such that those who are younger favor smaller social security benefits...

We study the effect of a declining labor force on the incentives to engage in labor-saving technical change and ask how this effect is influenced by institutional characteristics of the pension scheme. When labor is scarcer it becomes more expensive and innovation investments that increase labor...

If individuals are unable or unwilling to borrow, a higher than desired second pillar pension capital may induce people to retire earlier than they would have in the absence of such a scheme. Individuals thus leave the workforce as soon as the retirement income is deemed sufficient and the...

This paper studies the design of a nonlinear social security scheme in a society where individuals differ in two respects: productivity and degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save enoughʺ for their retirement because their myopic selfʺ emerges when labor supply and savings decisions...

The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the...