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We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish others. In particular, we disentangle the decision to be a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864590
To examine the effect of group size on the stability of prosocial behavior we used standard one-shot public good experiments with two and four subjects, which were conducted repeatedly three times at intervals of one week. Partner and stranger treatments were employed to control for group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010492332
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697819
We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011350155
This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments in a … repeated game setting. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the number of regions in a coalition …, partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the preference for a local public good is stronger. The main driving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994121
coordination ; asymmetric countries ; repeated game ; tax competition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732333
Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240848
Intelligence and personality significantly affect social outcomes of individuals. We study how and why these traits affect the outcome of groups, looking specifically at how these characteristics operate in repeated interactions providing opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011547729
that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e. full or partial tax coordination), whether partial tax …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509603
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485538