This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free …-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit … cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

strengthened if there exist outsiders that gain from cooperative break down. We investigate this in a laboratory experiment …

the model's predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper …

example by rationing outputs in a manner linked to firm size differences, have generally struggled. Any successful cartel has …

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …

environmental expenditures can justify public interest defence for the operation of a cartel. Using a variant of the Dixit … expenditures and higher welfare. However, allowing the operational firms to form a cartel and raise prices above Nash equilibrium …

a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …