Similar Search Results

Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2002

Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410230

Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements

Spycher, Sarah; Winkler, Ralph - 2021 - This version: December 2020

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013326522

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404554

Small states, large unitary states and federations

Wrede, Matthias - 2002

-ences, it analyzes strong Nash equilibria and coalition-proof equilibria at the union formation stage. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409985

Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade

Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2012

non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries' welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581727

On a three-alternative Condorcet jury theorem

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, François - 2011

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595

Optimal income taxation with tax competition

Lipatov, Vilen; Weichenrieder, Alfons J. - 2010

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982002

Optimal tariffs, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model

Felbermayr, Gabriel; Jung, Benjamin; Larch, Mario - 2011

This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009130204

Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model

Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009

We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806727

Temporary migration policies and welfare of the host and source countries : a game-theoretic approach

Djajić, Slobodan; Michael, Michael S. - 2009

This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888074