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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements and trade : taxes versus caps
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2014
This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404554
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Stable climate coalitions (Nash) and international trade
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2012
non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries' welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581727
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On a three-alternative Condorcet jury theorem
Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, François - 2011
We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three alternatives. The environment is the same as in the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet (1785)). Voters have common preferences that depend on the unknown state of nature, and they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595
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Trade retaliation in a monetary-trade model
Whalley, John; Yu, Jun; Zhang, Shunming - 2009
We explore how outcomes of trade policy retaliation (Nash tariff games) are affected when trade simultaneously takes places geographically across countries and through time via financial intermediation. In such models deficits and surpluses in goods trade are endogenously determined, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003806727
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Temporary migration policies and welfare of the host and source countries : a game-theoretic approach
Djajić, Slobodan; Michael, Michael S. - 2009
This paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003888074
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Optimal income taxation with tax competition
Lipatov, Vilen; Weichenrieder, Alfons J. - 2010
We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982002
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Entry regulation and the influence of an incumbent special interest group
Evans, John Bussell; Fingleton, John - 2002
The literature on both entry deterrence and the influence of special interest groups is extensive. In this paper we attempt to marry these strands of literature by developing a model of entry deterrence through interest group influence in an entry re-regulation context. In contrast to other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539115
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Optimal tariffs, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in the Melitz model
Felbermayr, Gabriel; Jung, Benjamin; Larch, Mario - 2011
This paper characterizes analytically the optimal tariff of a large one-sector economy with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity in general equilibrium, thereby extending the small-country results of Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (JIE, 2009) and the homogeneous firms framework of Gros...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009130204
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For want of a chair : teaching price formation using a cap and trade game
Carattini, Stefano; Fenichel, Eli P.; Gordan, Alexander; … - 2019
students how economic theory can be used in the real world by policy makers while teaching foundational economic concepts. By …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011992341
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Self-enforcing capital tax coordination
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - 2013
countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199703