We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual's effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for...

We examine whether the "Level-k" model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of...

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers' behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers' ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether...

We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as...

The literature on learning in unknown environments emphasises reinforcing on actions which produce positive results. But, in some cases, success requires shifting from a currently successful actions to others. We examine, experimentally and theoretically in a very simple framework, how...

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...

The employment of capital is rival in nature. Small countries do not benefit from taxing its employment. By contrast, the use of digital services is non-rival and small countries do benefit from taxing expenditures on such services. In fact, some countries have already decided to tax digital...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...

It has been argued that procedural formalism undermines economic efficiency by fostering rent-seeking and corruption. We challenge this view by arguing that a number of judicial procedures foster economic growth by increasing the predictability of court decisions, which leads to more...

Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their promises credible. But if politicians preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are measured by two...