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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision

Napel, Stefan (contributor); Widgrén, Mika (contributor) - 2004

This paper analyzes the a priori influence of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. In contrast to studies which use conventional power indices, both institutions are assumed to act...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002521708

Contract adjustment under uncertainty

Holden, Helge (contributor); Holden, Lars (contributor); … - 2005

Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to the other, in exchange for an exogenous service. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally require an adjustment of the contract payment, involving adjustment costs...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002856667

Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion

Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Müller, Daniel - 2014

, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex post. Based on the buyer's expectation management, our theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256140

Does female empowerment promote economic development?

Doepke, Matthias; Tertilt, Michele - 2014

Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to fathers) increases expenditures on children. From this, should we infer that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative model of household decision making to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250142

Loss aversion and ex post inefficient renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012 - This version: November 15, 2012

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long … ; incomplete contracts ; reference points ; employment contracts ; behavioral contract theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009687212

Hanging together or being hung separately : the strategic power of coalitions where bargaining occurs with incomplete information

Konrad, Kai A.; Cusack, Thomas R. - 2013

What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009691706

Social relations and relational incentives

Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2012

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009540101

Tax rate harmonization, renegotiation and asymmetric tax competition for profits with repeated interaction

Eggert, Wolfgang; Itaya, Jun-ichi - 2011

This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124157

Auctions vs. negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation

Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2015

For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962

Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation

Buchholz, Wolfgang (contributor); … - 2005

The Lindahl equilibrium is mostly motivated by a rather artificial price mechanism. Even though the analogy to a competitive market has been emphasised by Lindahl himself his approach does not directly explain the normative ideas, which are behind this concept. In the present paper we therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003121009