incentives to implement such a trigger? We construct a theoretical model of a bank that is financed with debt and equity, and a … bank manager monitoring the bank’s loan portfolio. The manager must be incentivized to warn the board before a crisis …

externalities between the two countries arise from cross-border bank ownership. The two countries face (i) a regulatory decision of … contrast, bailout policies are centralized only when international spillovers from cross-border bank ownership are strong, and …

Japanese banking crisis. By leveraging a unique dataset merging firm-level financial statements and bank balance sheets, the …

imply that an individual bank failure in one country could trigger negative spillover effects in another country. Such cross … from a supranational perspective. In consequence, the probability of a bank failure will be inefficiently high. Against the …

the public, long-term systemic risk among banks tends to increase. From the dynamic perspective, bank penalties represent … long-term. In this respect, bank penalties resemble still waters that run deep. In contrast, a settlement with regulatory …

financial crisis of the 20th century - the Great Depression. Using balance-sheet and systemic risk measures at the bank level …, we build an econometric model with incidental truncation that jointly considers bank survival, the type of bank closure … (consolidations, absorption, and failures), and changes to bank risk. Despite roughly 9,000 bank closures, risk did not leave the …

Limited liability and asymmetric information between an investment bank and its lenders provide an incentive for a bank …

coordinated ones when governments care equally about bank profits, taxpayers, and consumers. …