This paper documents the role of unemployment and earnings risk in reconciling evidence in payoff differentials between self-employment and paid-employment. Using Spanish administrative data, we characterize the distribution and dynamics of earnings and document lower and less dispersed earnings...

How do different characteristics of pay-for-performance schemes affect fairness perceptions? In two studies, we systematically consider three major classes of incentive schemes: continuous piece rate incentives, discrete bonus schemes, and tournament incentives. We find that pay inequality has a...

This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others...

This study examines the impact of domestic outsourcing on the wages of workers performing outsourced tasks in Türkiye, using an administrative employee-employer linked dataset. Outsourcing events are identified by tracking worker flows across firms with specific properties. Unlike existing...

We analyse the implications of habit formation relating to wages in a multi-period efficiency-wage model. If employees have such preferences, their existence provides firms with incentives to raise wages and reduce employment over time. Greater intensity does not necessarily have the same...

Using matched employer-employee-contract data for Portugal - a country with near-universal union coverage - we find evidence of a sizable effect of union affiliation on wages. Gelbach's (2016) decomposition procedure is next deployed to ascertain the contributions of worker, firm, match, and...

We show theoretically and empirically that executives are paid less for their own firm's performance and more for their rivals' performance if an industry's firms are more commonly owned by the same set of investors. Higher common ownership also leads to higher unconditional total pay. We...

We study an important mechanism underlying employee referrals into informal low skilled jobs in developing countries. Employers can exploit social preferences between employee referees and potential workers to improve discipline. The profitability of using referrals increases with referee stakes...

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

This paper considers the optimal level of firm-specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the...