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Strategic restraint in contests
Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2000
Economic policy is modeled as the outcome of a (political) game between two inte rest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature the policies fought for are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781546
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Where are the rent seekers?
Hillman, Arye L.; Ursprung, Heinrich W. - 2016
In a remarkably simple and yet in one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock observed that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447512
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Technological determinants of the group-size paradox
Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - 2011
The present paper analyzes situations in which groups compete for rents. A major result in the literature has been that there are both cases where larger groups have advantages and cases where they have disadvantages. The paper provides two intuitive criteria which for groups with homogenous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011374
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A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups
Brandauer, Stefan (contributor);  … - 2006
We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003300999
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Politics of randomness
Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - 2002
The main drawback of the public-policy contest is that the notion of contest success function, a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011513996
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Pareto-improving structural reforms
Saint-Paul, Gilles - 2018
Economists recommend to partly redistribute gains to losers from a structural reform, which in many cases may be … required for making the reform politically viable. However, taxation is distortionary. Then, it is unclear that compensatory … transfers can support a Pareto-improving reform. This paper provides sufficient conditions for this to occur, despite tax …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011941166
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The perks of being in the smaller team : incentives in overlapping contests
March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2019
We investigate overlapping contests in multi-divisional organizations in which an individual's effort simultaneously determines the outcome of several contests on different hierarchical levels. We show that individuals in smaller units are advantaged in the grand (organization-wide) contest for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138834
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Strategic housing policy, migration and sorting around population thresholds
De Witte, Kristof; Geys, Benny - 2015
We analyse whether, when and how local office-holders respond to the personal, economic incentives embedded in exogenously imposed population thresholds leading to an increased number and/or remuneration of local office-holders. Using data from all 589 Belgian municipalities over the period...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397184
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Insecure property rights and the missing middle
Grigoryan, Aram; Polborn, Mattias - 2018
We analyze a theoretical model in which entrepreneurs' property rights are threatened by "raiders" who can challenge them to a contest for control of their firms. Entrepreneurs have heterogeneous productivity, and decide how much capital to invest before raiders decide whom to attack. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897580
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the "discouragement effect." Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489403