standard voting model, we show that information is aggregated in large committees provided disesteem payoffs are not overly … disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. An example is FDA committees, where committee members can …, information aggregation fails in large committees and the committee rejects the innovation almost surely, providing an explanation …

reasoning), but strikingly overestimate their pivotality when voting (contradicting plain lying aversion). That is, committees … committees. Subjects get private signals about the state of world, send binary messages, and finally vote under either majority … truthful messages and sincere voting. A simple one-parameteric generalization of quantal response equilibrium capturing …

information aggregation with vote-contingent payoffs and generically characterize voting behavior in large committees. We use this …Numerous theoretical studies have shown that information aggregation through voting is fragile. We consider a model of …

recommendations. We find that voting recommendations do indeed matter, implying that even in a secularized world, religion plays a … crucial role in voting decisions. …

different voting rules, the frequency of votes for the moral transgression increases with the number of votes required for it … us to identify guilt sharing and preferences for consensual voting as empirically relevant and independent drivers of … voting behavior. …

, discuss the difficulties with dynamic voting procedures and review some ways to overcome them. We conclude by highlighting the …