derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … efficiency in experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three …. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with … well, including those in which voters vote informatively. -- efficient information aggregation ; simple plurality rule …

A rational-expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing … average portfolio demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size. More information diminishes the … endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria …

is privately informed about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in … equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the outcome depends both on the … structure of the sellers' information and, even more importantly, on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules …

aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

We study how experts influence consumer behavior and welfare by focusing on the Booker Prize. Leveraging the …

In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their … customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown … situation in which experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always …