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A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

Hassler, John; Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente; … - 2002

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary e.ects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539071

Precise control over legislative vote outcomes : a forensic approach to political economics

Matter, Ulrich; Slotwinski, Michaela - 2016

We propose a forensic approach to investigate the politico-economic forces that influence narrow vote outcomes in legislative assemblies. Applying nonparametric estimation techniques to a data set covering all roll call votes between 1990 and 2014, we can identify the existence of precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509565

Vote buying in the US Congress

Matter, Ulrich; Roberti, Paolo; Slotwinski, Michaela - 2019

We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103631

Local candidates and distributive politics under closed-list proportional representation

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill H.; Smith, Daniel M. - 2018

Geographic representation is an important consideration in candidate nominations, even under closed-list proportional … representation (PR), and may even matter for distributive policy outcomes. However, since nominations are determined strategically …, the causal effects of local representation are difficult to identify. We investigate the relationship between local …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011846263

Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

Gersbach, Hans - 2009

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003897539

Pay for politicians and candidate selection : an empirical analysis

Kotakorpi, Kaisa; Poutvaara, Panu - 2010

A growing theoretical literature on the effect of politicians' salaries on the average level of skills of political candidates yields ambiguous predictions. In this paper, we estimate the effect of pay for politicians on the level of education of parliamentary candidates. We take advantage of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003986878

The influence of special interests and party activists on electoral competition

Martineau, Nicolas-Guillaume - 2012

This paper studies the effects on electoral competition of political parties relying on monetary donations and volunteer labour for their electioneering activities. It also examines whether a recorded decline in party activism increases special-interest influence on party policy platforms....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535105

Repeated lobbying by commercial lobbyists and special interests

Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - 2016

. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444131

Tainted money? : contribution limits and the effectiveness of campaign spending

Stratmann, Thomas - 2003

Campaign expenditures are not effective in increasing candidates vote shares if voters do not respond to the advertisement when they believe that campaign expenditures are financed with tainted money. In this situation, limiting contributions may reduce the number of policy favors that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509494

Using political financing reforms to measure campaign spending effects on electoral outcomes

François, Abel; Visser, Michael S.; Wilner, Lionel - 2016

This paper studies the impact of campaign spending on votes in French legislative elections. We exploit the political financing reforms which were adopted in France in the mid-1990s. Under the new laws, spending limits were reduced, legal persons were no longer allowed to finance candidates, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571513

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