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Altruism and envy in contests : an evolutionarily stable symbiosis

Konrad, Kai A. - 2002

Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514081

Contests over public goods : evolutionary stability and the free-rider problem

Leininger, Wolfgang - 2002

We analyze group contests for public goods by applying the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). We show that a global ESS cannot exist, because a mutant free-rider can always invade group behavior successfully. There does exist, however, a unique local ESS, which we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409788

Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction

Bos, Olivier; Roussillon, Béatrice; Schweinzer, Paul - 2013

infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772819

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments : motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin - 2013

discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey … of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper … argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792228

On the sensitivity of collective action to uncertainty about climate tipping points

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2014

Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point", is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249688

To commit or not to commit? : an experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information

Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - 2014

In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361371

The bail-out! : positive political economics of greek-type crises in the EMU

Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - 2010

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697133

Tax competition, the distribution of MNE's ownership and the wage formation process

Gérard, Marcel - 2002

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408608

Pledge-and-review bargaining

Harstad, Bård - 2018

Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on … climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public …, each equilibrium pledge coincides with an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The weights placed on others. payouts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924561

Does the winner take it all? : redistributive policies and political extremism

Daniele, Gianmarco; Piolatto, Amedeo; Sassen, Wim - 2020

We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. economic history, geography, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in federations. When the outcome of federal policies – such as transfer schemes, market regulation or migration laws – depends on these fundamentals,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200220