Showing 1 - 10 of 564
Altruists and envious people who meet in contests are symbionts. They do better than a population of narrowly rational individuals. If there are only altruists and envious individuals, a particular mixture of altruists and envious individuals is evolutionarily stable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011514081
infracting upon productive efficiency. The mechanism employs a contest creating incentives among participating nations to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772819
The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697133
In a recent paper Konrad and Thum (2014) present a model that shows that unilateral pre-commitment reduces the likelihood of agreement in bilateral negotiations over the provision of a public good when parties have private information over their contribution costs. We test the model in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361371
discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey … of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper … argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792228
Previous research shows that collective action to avoid a catastrophic threshold, such as a climate "tipping point", is unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of crossing the threshold but that collective action collapses if the location of the threshold is uncertain. Theory suggests that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010249688
We identify the inefficiencies that arise when negotiation between two parties takes place in the presence of transaction costs. First, for some values of these costs it is efficient to reach an agreement but the unique equilibrium outcome is one in which agreement is never reached. Secondly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781708
Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on … climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public …, each equilibrium pledge coincides with an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The weights placed on others. payouts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924561
We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. economic history, geography, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in federations. When the outcome of federal policies – such as transfer schemes, market regulation or migration laws – depends on these fundamentals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200220
We report experimental findings on the role of charitable promises in bargaining settings. We vary the enforceability of … char-itable donation. By reneging on initial pledges, dishonest proposers can turn the bargaining power to their advantage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534829