Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 174
Cover Image
Team production in competitive labor markets with adverse selection
Siemens, Ferdinand von; Kosfeld, Michael - 2014
Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can … create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team's performance and … therefore on their colleagues' productivity. We study the effects of such externalities in a competitive labor market if workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010245995
Cover Image
The spatial organization of multinational firms
Defever, Fabrice - 2010
firm of locating its activities (production, headquarters, R&D, logistics and sales) close together. We find that, after …. However, the impact of distance is dependent on the type of investment (production or service). While within-firm co …-location is important for both service and production activities, only production plants are likely to be located close to prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008808240
Cover Image
Global sourcing decisions and firm productivity : evidence from Spain
Kohler, Wilhelm; Smolka, Marcel - 2009
We investigate the link between productivity of firms and their sourcing behavior. Following Antràs & Helpman (2004) we distinguish between domestic and foreign sourcing, as well as between outsourcing and vertical integration. A firm's choice is driven by a hold-up problem caused by lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923683
Cover Image
Mergers and partial ownership
Foros, Oystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg Eric - 2010
In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement and find that partial ownership arrangements can be more profitable for the acquiring and acquired firm because they can result in a greater dampening of competition. We also derive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003925257
Cover Image
Optimal delegation when the large shareholder has multiple tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - 2010
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965886
Cover Image
Competition and trust : evidence from German car manufacturers
Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; Stahl, Konrad - 2011
We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyer trust, that higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010507
Cover Image
Formal contracts, relational contracts, and the threat-point effect
Itō, Hideshi; Morita, Hodaka - 2011
Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240848
Cover Image
Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages : the role of internal organization, information, and market structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398061
Cover Image
Buying to sell : private equity buyouts and industrial restructuring
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Tåg, Joacim - 2013
We show how temporary ownership by private equity firms affects industry structure, competition and welfare. Temporary ownership leads to strong investment incentives because equilibrium resale prices are determined by buyers incentives to block rivals from obtaining assets. These incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772935
Cover Image
Firm reputation and incentives to "milk" pending patents
Koenen, Johannes; Peitz, Martin - 2013
In this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation to only apply for a patent whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009773847