Similar Search Results

Black sheep or scapegoats? : implementable monitoring policies under unobservable levels of misbehavior

Buechel, Berno; Mühlheußer, Gerd - 2014

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256706

Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion

Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016

can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186

Deterrence or backlash? : arrests and the dynamics of domestic violence

Amaral, Sofia; Dahl, Gordon B.; Endl-Geyer, Victoria; … - 2023

period during a volatile, at-risk time. In the longer run, we estimate a sizeable deterrence effect. Substantiating this …, arrest increases the probability an offender is charged with a crime. Our findings argue against recent calls for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013486081

Payment evasion

Bühler, Stefan; Halbheer, Daniel; Lechner, Michael - 2015

This paper models payment evasion as a source of profit by letting the firm choose the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders. For a given price and fine, the consumers purchase, evade payment, or choose the outside option. We show that payment evasion leads to a form of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518819

Legal uncertainty as a welfare enhancing screen

Lang, Matthias - 2016

threshold of legality is uncertain. I show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare. Legal uncertainty changes deterrence in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557794

Preponderance of evidence

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - 2002

This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the preponderance of evidence' standard provides maximal incentives to exert care. This holds even though litigants...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409967

Optimal law enforcement with sophisticated and naive offenders

Buechel, Berno; Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd - 2018

Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864423

Salience of law enforcement : a field experiment

Dur, Robert A. J.; Vollaard, Ben A. - 2017

We conduct a field experiment to examine whether the deterrent effect of law enforcement can be strengthened by making law enforcement activities more salient. Our focus is on illegal disposal of household garbage in residential areas. At a random subset of 56 locations in a city in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659373

Efficient institutions and effective deterrence : on timing and uncertainty of formal sanctions

Buckenmaier, Johannes; Dimant, Eugen; Posten, Ann-Christin - 2020

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty … thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012171815

Honesty nudges : effect varies with content but not with timing

Le Maux, Benoît; Necker, Sarah - 2023

We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual's dishonesty strengthens the effect of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013494041