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We examine the strategic use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in imperfectly competitive markets. The level of CSR determines the weight a firm puts on consumer surplus in its objective function before it decides upon supply. First, we consider symmetric Cournot competition and show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659485
In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663529
We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. economic history, geography, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in federations. When the outcome of federal policies – such as transfer schemes, market regulation or migration laws – depends on these fundamentals,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012200220
Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345239
We reassess the well-known "narrow-but-deep" versus "broad-but-shallow" trade-off in international environmental agreements (IEAs), taking into account the principal-agent relationship induced by the hierarchical structure of international policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012388125
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of … the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866
Antidumping creates opportunities for abuse to stifle market competition. Whether cartels actually abuse trade policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012373130
-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties … imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with … cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282
Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate … for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority … focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop structures that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362394