The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take...

The impact of corporate income taxes on location decisions of firms is widely debated in the tax competition literature. Tax rate differences across jurisdictions may lead to distortions of firms investment decisions. Empirical evidence on tax induced relocation and subsequent economic...

Motivated by the EU Commission s suggested company tax reforms, this paper investigates how cross-border loss offset and formulary apportionment of a consolidated tax base affect the investment and transfer pricing behaviour of a multijurisdictional firm, and how they affect the behaviour of...

This paper shows how the distribution of the ownership of multinational companies and the labour market conditions, especially the wage formation process, influence the outcome of interjurisdictional tax competition and coordination. In particular, it sets forth that equilibrium corporate tax...

This paper proposes an analysis of two major tax events which occurred in the European Union in 2001, the move of Germany from imputation to exemption and the objective announced by the EU Commission to provide EU businesses with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities. In...

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer's sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that...

We set up a general model on capital mobility which contains many of the models in the literature as special cases. The race to the bottom results not from a capital flight effect, but rather from a kind of Laffer curve effect in public good provision. Selectively introducing simplifying...

According to the Globalization Paradox, globalization limits the freedom of choice for national governments. Capital mobility in particular induces tax competition, thus putting downward pressure on capital taxes. However, while capital mobility introduces the inefficiency of tax competition, it...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a "second-mover advantage." In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard levels. We introduce this feature to an...

This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling s Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an...