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Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry

Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the … asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and analyze how each group's internal conflict in-fluences its chance of … winning in the external conflict. We find that a more symmetric group may expend more effort in external conflict when the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392

An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; … - 2009

. -- Colonel Blotto ; conflict resolution ; contest theory ; multi-dimensional resource allocation ; rent-seeking ; experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854423

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

Meier, Volker - 2010

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008806532

On the private provision of contentious public characteristics

Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2012

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571064

Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods

Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp C. - 2012

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490611

Conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion

Cubitt, Robin P.; Gächter, Simon; Quercia, Simone - 2015

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods game to classify subjects by type of contribution preference and by belief about the contributions of others; and we measure betrayal aversion for different categories of subject....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298544

On the efficient provision of public goods by means of lotteries

Franke, Jörg; Leininger, Wolfgang - 2013

We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706153

Top of the class : the importance of ordinal rank

Murphy, Richard; Weinhardt, Felix - 2014 - This version: 10 May 2014

This paper examines the long-run impact of ordinal rank during primary school on productivity using comprehensive English administrative data. Identification is obtained from variation in test score distributions across cohorts and subjects, such that the same score relative to the class mean...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358274

Efficiency, welfare, and political competition

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014

We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277

Negotiating to avoid "gradual" versus "dangerous" climate change : an experimental test of two prisoners' dilemmas

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2014

According to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, global collective action is needed to stabilize "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous [our emphasis] anthropogenic interference with the climate system." The Framework Convention thus...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229864

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