We consider a monopolistic supplierś optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform...

This paper analyzes the generalized quality differentiation model in multi-sided markets with positive externalities, which leads to new insights into the optimal pricing structure of the firm. We find that quality differentiation for users on one side affects not only the side involving...

In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been the higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the...

In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the...

We provide the first estimates of the extent of common ownership of competing firms in Australia. Combining data on market shares and substantial shareholdings, we calculate the impact of common ownership on effective market concentration. Among firms where we can identify at least one owner, 31...

Two players with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) negotiate an agreement over several issues and one transfer. We show that, as long as their preferences are differentially distorted, an issue will be inefficiently left out of the agreement or inefficiently...

Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other....

We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...