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Fishing for excuses and performance evaluation

Larmande, François; Ponssard, Jean-Pierre - 2014

We study a principal-agent model in which the agent can provide ex post additional relevant information regarding his performance. In particular, he can provide a legitimate excuse, that is, evidence that a poor result is only due to factors outside his control. However, building a convincing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010229868

Entry through the narrow door : the costs of just failing high stakes exams

Machin, Stephen; McNally, Sandra; Ruiz-Valenzuela, Jenifer - 2018

In many countries, important thresholds in examinations act as a gateway to higher levels of education and/or good employment prospects. This paper examines the consequences of just failing a key high stakes national examination in English taken at the end of compulsory schooling in England. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011840777

Collusion, blackmail and whistle-blowing

Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - 2015

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518807

Policy innovations, political preferences, and cartel prosecutions

Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015

, collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282

Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434582

Social capital and collusion : the case of merchant guilds

Dessí, Roberta; Olgivie, Sheilagh - 2003

Merchant guilds have been portrayed as social networks that generated beneficial social capital by sustaining shared norms, effectively transmitting information, and successfully undertaking collective action. This social capital, it is claimed, benefited society as a whole by enabling rulers to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509466

Collusion in beauty contests

Wambach, Achim - 2002

During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so-called Beauty Contests. There seems to be a wide consensus among economists that in these and other contexts like privatisation an auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409963

Collusion by algorithm: the role of unobserved actions

Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander - 2022

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013093034

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a … distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938866

Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013

problem is to certify the private signal and make it public. When collusion between the certifier and the agent is an issue … manipulation. We show that certification of private information by a third party may not always be in the interest of the principal … if this certification raises the specter of collusion. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662