with respect to both emissions and membership. In that encompassing IEA game the size of the coalition is increasing in the … values, the grand coalition may or may not be attained if one of the moral parameter increases and tends towards one. …

climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend … on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of … higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition. …

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of … international environmental agreements on climate change, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without … becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, which …

non-coalition countries with regard to emissions and welfare and compare business as usual with the coalition … liberalization by moving from autarky to free trade. Although the coalition steps up its mitigation effort, world emissions rise … environment as well as for the coalition countries' welfare and the aggregate welfare of all countries; it reduces the range of …

international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on …. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries … of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …