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Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

King of the hill : giving backward induction its best shot

Dufwenberg, Martin; Van Essen, Matthew - 2016

We study a class of deceptively similar games, which however have different player sets and predictions that vary with their cardinality. The economic, biological, political, and psychological applications are many. The game-theoretic principles involved are compelling as predictions rely on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557869

On a three-alternative Condorcet jury theorem

Goertz, Johanna M. M.; Maniquet, François - 2011

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three …. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with … well, including those in which voters vote informatively. -- efficient information aggregation ; simple plurality rule …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009127595

The value of technology improvements in games with externalities : a fresh look at offsetting behavior

Hoy, Michael; Polborn, Mattias - 2014

How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354804

Tailored Bayesian mechanisms : experimental evidence from two-stage voting games

Engelmann, Dirk; Grüner, Hans Peter - 2017

Optimal voting rules have to be tailored to the underlying distribution of preferences. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals' payoffs if players...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011624232

International environmental agreements with uncertainty, learning and risk aversion

Finus, Michael; Pintassilgo, Pedro; Ulph, Alistair - 2014

This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234539

A strategic R&D investment with flexible development time in real option game analysis

Villani, Giovanni - 2009

externalities and so, the option exercise by the Leader generates an Information Revelationʺ that benefits the Follower. Moreover …. -- American Exchange options ; game theory ; Montecarlo simulation ; R&D ; information revelation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003872189

It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply : conditional norm-following with strategic beliefs

Bicchieri, Cristina; Dimant, Eugen; Sonderegger, Silvia - 2020 - This version: January 13, 2020

We experimentally investigate whether individuals strategically distort their beliefs about dominant norms. Embedded in the context of lying, we systematically vary both the nature of elicited beliefs (descriptive about what others do, or normative about what others approve of) and whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012154298

Lies in disguise : a theoretical analysis of cheating

Dufwenberg, Martin <Jr>; Dufwenberg, Martin - 2016

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011566513

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - 2022

payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the … asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255847