Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,740
Cover Image
Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance
Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor - 2001
Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398910
Cover Image
Genetic testing and repulsion from chance
Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore; Vislie, Jon - 2004
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person s well-being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402443
Cover Image
Market transparency, adverse selection, and moral hazard
Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad - 2013
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227243
Cover Image
Information design in insurance markets : selling peaches in a market for lemons
García, Daniel; Teper, Roee; Tsur, Matan - 2018
This paper characterizes the optimal information structure in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection. A regulator assigns ratings to individuals according to their risk characteristics, insurers offer fixed insurance contracts to each rating group, and the market clears as in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011789043
Cover Image
The macroeconomic effects of longevity risk under private and public insurance and asymmetric information
Heijdra, Ben J.; Jiang, Yang; Mierau, Jochen O. - 2017
We study the impact of a fully-funded social security system in an economy with heterogeneous consumers. The unobservability of individual health conditions leads to adverse selection in the private annuity market. Introducing social security - which is immune to adverse selection - affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761551
Cover Image
Softening competition by enhancing entry : an example from the banking industry
Bouckaert, Jan; Degryse, Hans - 2002
We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011541031
Cover Image
Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier (contributor) - 2008
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003763172
Cover Image
Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have … welfare losses is 1/ n2 [hoch 2] . The results extend to demand schedule competition and a range of applications in product … and financial markets are presented. -- reverse auction ; demand schedule competition ; market power ; adverse selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003910453
Cover Image
Asset auctions, information, and liquidity
Vives, Xavier - 2010
A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923763
Cover Image
A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - 2011
We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)'s 'anticipatory equilibrium' by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of competitors'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011830