. We show that the risk allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift … part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a workout of banking crises, depositors receive non-contingent contracts … generations, even if the underlying risk is small or zero. This provides a new justification for capital requirements. …

We argue that since there are several impediments to international risk sharing, the welfare gains from full … international risk sharing, which have been the object of analysis in the previous literature, are not suggestive. Instead, we study … the gains from feasible risk sharing and find that they are considerable (0:5% increase inpermanent consumption). Marginal …

We investigate empirically how industrialized countries and U.S. states share consumption risk at horizons between one … and thirty years. U.S. federal states share about 50 percent of their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross … share any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Our results suggest that purely transaction cost based theories cannot …