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Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003763282
liquidity risk and characterizes them. Both a solvency (leverage) and a liquidity ratio are required to control the … fund managers are more conservative the liquidity requirement has to be strengthened while the solvency one relaxed. Higher … financial intermediary is opaque) and, correspondingly, liquidity requirements should be tightened. The model is applied to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230899
opportunity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates two groups of subjects who are similar but have different … long-run losses. Initially similar, cooperation rates for groups with different intelligence levels diverge, declining in … groups of lower intelligence, and increasing to reach almost full cooperation levels in groups of higher intelligence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011547729
hampers cooperation, as higher intelligence players are less cooperative once they are made aware that they play against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012652718
artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the … prisoner’s dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely … also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543708
This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agencygame with discrete types and direct revelation mechanisms. After presentinga general algorithm to find the pure-strategy equilibria of this game, we use itto characterize these equilibria when the two principals control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011400396
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
identify individual punishment patterns and link them with individual cooperation patterns. Classifying N = 628 subjects along … these two dimensions documents that cooperation and punishment patterns are intuitively aligned for most individuals … are more crucial for achieving cooperation than conditional cooperators. Incorporating information on punishment types …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011587542
We study how punishment influences conditional cooperation. We ask two questions: 1) how does conditional cooperation … change if a subject can be punished and 2) how does conditional cooperation change if a subject has the power to punish … cooperation. We find that the possibility of being punished increases the strength of conditional cooperation. At the same time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864590
Wealthier households obtain higher returns on their investments than poorer ones. How should the tax system account for this return inequality? I study capital taxation in an economy in which return rates endogenously correlate with wealth. The leading example is a financial market, where the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499593