We develop a non-linear forecast combination rule based on copulas that incorporate the dynamic interaction between individual predictors. This approach is optimal in the sense that the resulting combined forecast produces the highest discriminatory power as measured by the receiver operating...

In this paper we specify a linear Cliff and Ord-type spatial model. The model allows for spatial lags in the dependent variable, the exogenous variables, and disturbances. The innovations in the disturbance process are assumed to be heteroskedastic with an unknown form. We formulate a multi-step...

This paper proposes a novel regularisation method for the estimation of large covariance matrices, which makes use of insights from the multiple testing literature. The method tests the statistical significance of individual pair-wise correlations and sets to zero those elements that are not...

We present representative evidence of discrimination against migrants through an incentivized choice experiment with over 2,000 participants. Decision makers allocate a fixed endowment between two receivers. To measure discrimination, we randomly vary receivers’ migration background and other...

This paper contributes to the on-going empirical debate regarding the role of the RBC model and in particular of technology shocks in explaining aggregate fluctuations. To this end we estimate the model's posterior density using Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) methods. Within this framework we...

Using a two-sector endogenous growth model, this paper explores how productivity shocks in the goods and human capital producing sectors contribute to explaining aggregate cycles in output, consumption, investment and hours. To contextualize our findings, we also assess whether the human capital...

I study a two-period model of conflict with two combatants and a third party who is an ally of one of the combatants. The third party is fully informed about the type of her ally but not about the type of her ally's enemy. There is a signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy...

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...