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Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore - 2017

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700470

Fear, trust and demand for regulation : evidence from the Covid-19 pandemic in Russia

Borisova, Ekaterina; Frye, Timothy; Schoors, Koen; … - 2022

Understanding demand for state regulation is a foundational issue for social science. To account for this demand … attention to fear. We test how fear and trust shape demand for government regulation by drawing on especially precise measures … fear of contracting the virus is directly related to greater demand for regulation. In addition, the impact of trust is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013473338

A look upstream : electricity market restructuring, risk, procurement contracts and efficiency

Di Maria, Corrado; Lange, Ian; Lazarova, Emiliya A. - 2014 - This version: November 25, 2014

This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically how upstream markets are affected by deregulation downstream. Deregulation tends to increase the level of uncertainty in the upstream market. Our theoretical analysis predicts that deregulated firms respond to this increase in uncertainty by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010464693

Liberalizing Russian gas markets : an economic analysis

Aune, Finn Roar; Golombek, Rolf; Hallre, Hilde; Moe, Arild - 2015

purpose, we use a detailed numerical model for the energy markets in Europe and Russia - LIBEMOD. Our results suggest that … removing implicit subsidies to Russian gas consumers will have substantial impacts on total consumption of gas in Russia …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533092

Auctions and corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659

Bureaucrats and public procurement

Bös, Dieter - 2001

This paper deals with a Niskanen type of public-procurement agency. It is shown that the procurement game should be separated into an investment game and a project game, the first game to be played before nature determines the actual real-izations of benefit and costs of the project, the second...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399307

Probabilistic procurement auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - 2013

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money that they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the offered quality of the technology or good. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765519

The impact of city contracting set-asides on black self-employment and employment

Chatterji, Aaron K.; Chay, Kenneth Y.; Fairlie, Robert W. - 2013

In the 1980s, many U.S. cities initiated programs reserving a proportion of government contracts for minority-owned businesses. The staggered introduction of these set-aside programs is used to estimate their impacts on the self-employment and employment rates of African-American men. Black...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727119

Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2012

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689581

Discrimination in dynamic procurement design with learning-by-doing

Barbosa, Klenio; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2012

Discriminatory programs that favor local and small firms in government procurement are common in many countries. This paper studies the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009630098

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