I derive values of marginal changes in a public good for two-person households, measured alternatively by household member is̕ willingness to pay (WTP) for the good on behalf of the household, WTPi(H), or by the sum of individual WTP values across family members, WTP(C). Households are assumed...

I study climate policy choices for a "policy bloc" of fuel-importers, when a "fringe" of other fuel importers have no climate policy, fuel exporters consume no fossil fuels, and importers produce no such fuels. The policy bloc and exporter blocs act strategically in fossil fuel markets. When the...

We study optimal climate policy for a "policy bloc" of countries facing a market where emissions offsets can be purchased from a non-policy "fringe" of countries (such as for the CDM). Policy-bloc firms benefit from free quota allocations whose quantity is updated according to firms' past...

We derive the optimal exchange rate policy for a small open economy subject to terms-oftrade shocks. Firm owners and workers are risk averse but workers more so. Wages are given or partially indexed in the short run, and capital markets are imperfect. The government sets the exchange rate to...