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Coordination with differential time preferences : experimental evidence
Agranov, Marina; Kim, Jeongbin; Yariv, Leeat - 2023
The experimental literature on repeated games has largely focused on settings where players discount the future identically. In applications, however, interactions often occur between players whose time preferences differ. We study experimentally the effects of discounting differentials in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014284761
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A theory of indifference based on status-seeking behaviour
Marjit, Sugata; Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh; Pandey, … - 2023
This paper explores the reluctance of men (women) to acknowledge or recognise the work, comments, and claims of new ideas by other men (women) via widespread and intense demonstrations of indifference. Instances like desk rejections by journals by not allowing papers to reach a review stage,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265989
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Social preferences under the shadow of the future
Kölle, Felix; Quercia, Simone; Tripodi, Egon - 2023
Social interactions predominantly take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as predominantly driven by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014307664
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Algorithmic cooperation
Kasberger, Bernhard; Martin, Simon; Normann, Hans-Theo; … - 2024
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. These situations are often strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the deter-minants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We run a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543708
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Bayesian repeated games and reputations
Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693
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Efficient coordination in weakest-link games
Riedl, Arno; Rohde, Ingrid M. T.; Strobel, Martin - 2011
" to become high performers. -- efficient coordination ; weakest-link ; minimum effort ; neighborhood choice ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009412373
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Contagion in stable networks
Bougheas, Spiros P. - 2017
that the completely connected network is stable, although, its exact structure, and thus contagion implications, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011735929
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The attack and defense of weakest-link networks
Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2010
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008697819
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On optimal social convention in voluntary continuation prisoner's dilemma games
Vesely, Filip; Yang, Chun-lei - 2013
When the repeated prisoner's dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227240
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Going green : framing effects in a dynamic coordination game
Gerlagh, Reyer; Heijden, Eline C. van der - 2015
transition between externality networks. Groups consisting of three subjects start in a stable benchmark equilibrium with network … externality. Over seven rounds, they can transit to an alternative stable equilibrium based on the other network. The alternative … network has higher payoffs, but the transition is slow and costly. Coordination is required to implement the transition while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392475