asymmetries of information are bilateral, i.e., if universities observe a private signal of each student's ability, or if there …

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post … information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and … ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in …

signaling game between the third party and her ally's enemy where preferences do not satisfy the single-crossing condition … information about the strength of her ally's enemy can be strategically exploited by the enemy through pronouncements that would … information to the third party. In some cases, the third party and her ally are strictly better off if the third-party's decision …

effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv …) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social … smaller communities have more volatile turnout than larger communities. -- electoral incentives ; signaling ; voting …

electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the … volatile turnout than larger communities. -- electoral incentives ; signaling ; voting …

-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest, or not, in case preparation, and the uninformed party … ; signaling …

have incentives to acquire information that makes incentive contracts ineffective. …