measures of workers' productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers. Our data show …-trustworthy workers. -- information ; skills ; laboratory experiments ; gift exchange games ; optimal contracts …

laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider … two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also …

information. The absence of the signaling effect seems related to the perception of managers' intentions, a mitigating but … evidence for the hypothesized signaling effect. Having an informed manager set the incentive does not change employees' be …

contracts, mitigating information frictions in international trade. There is little evidence for the relaxation of financial …

reduces the incentives to exert effort in R&D activities. Then, drawing on the signaling role of patents highlighted by the …

' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information …In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains … equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise not possible. Our results also imply that …

goods games that were based on only signaling information (i.e., about the quality of the public good or the return to … which increases his unit cost of contribution. The leader has private information about his type and his cost of … contributing to the public good. The model combines a follower's concern for fairness and informational signaling about …

Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to … untruthfully signal to have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and non-pecuniary motives. This …