We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …

introduce and determine a rational signaling equilibrium which adds two domination-based conditions to the belief structure of a …

Spence (1973) model of job market signaling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in …We study competitive equilibrium in a signaling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic … addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e. their expertise …

We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is … biases generate prior-dependent information preferences, such that agents may avoid information when being unconfident but … are information seeking otherwise. Because belief updating depends on the decision problem in which new information is …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders' sensibility for the signaling concern is …