sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …

of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and … monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …

show that, if the search requirements are well chosen, a perfect monitoring scheme can in principle increase the job … ignores their misperception problem. In sum, introducing a perfect monitoring scheme can be a Pareto improvement. However, if … job search requirements. Imperfections in the measurement of job-search effort further reduce the chances that monitoring …

measures such as monitoring and job search assistance for each period of unemployment in a dynamic environment with negative …

¤ort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search … effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions … represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system …