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In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games....
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This paper derives a micro-founded gravity equation in general equilibrium based on a translog demand system that allows for endogenous markups and rich substitution patterns across goods. In contrast to standard CES-based gravity equations, trade is more sensitive to trade costs if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003956003
This paper employs a stylized New Keynesian DSGE model for a monetary union to analyze whether cyclical inflation differentials can be explained by cross-country differences concerning the characteristics of financial markets. Our results suggest that empirically plausible degrees of...
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We assess the role of national fiscal policies, as automatic stabilizers, within a monetary union. We use a two-country New Keynesian DGE model which incorporates non-Ricardian consumers (as in Galì et al. 2004) and a home bias in the composition of national consumption bundles. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301196
We build a tractable stylized model of external sovereign debt and endogenous international interest rates. In corrupt economies with rent-seeking groups stealing public resources, a politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by permanent fiscal impatience which leads to excessive issuing of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009240852
We consider the political economy of a monetary union wheremember governments attempt to influence the policy of the commoncentral bank. Modeling this as a common agency with incentivecontracts, we show that if incentives are all that matters for the bank,the equilibrium implements a weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397656