This paper proposes a new double-question survey method that elicits information about how individuals.subjective belief valuations are compared and related to their price expectations. An individual respondent is presented with two sets of questions, one that asks about his/her belief regarding...

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...

We run a field experiment to quantify the economic returns to data and informational externalities associated with algorithmic recommendation relative to human curation in the context of online news. Our results show that personalized recommendation can outperform human curation in terms of user...

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the...

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...