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Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valsek, … - 2014

In this paper, we consider a committee of experts that decides whether to approve or reject a proposed innovation on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356364

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? : an experimental investigation

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2018

This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038

Pro bono work and trust in expert fields

Ong, David; Yang, Chun-lei - 2014 - This version: July 26, 2014

aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383298

Disguising lies : image concerns and partial lying in cheating games

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk - 2017

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130

Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662

Who cares when value (mis)reporting may be found out? : an acquiring-a-company experiment with value messages and information leaks

Di Cagno, Daniela; Güth, Werner; Lohse, Tim; Marazzi, … - 2023

We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014265847

Communication and social preferences : an experimental analysis

Cabrales, Antonio; Feri, Francesco; Gottardi, Piero; … - 2021

This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418635

Bayesian repeated games and reputations

Forges, Françoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256693

I care what you think : social image concerns and the strategic revelation of past pro-social behavior

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2019

other people, even though a favorable reputation has no immediate material benefits. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011966892

"Sherlocking" and platform information policy

Choi, Jay Pil; Kim, Kyungmin; Mukherjee, Arijit - 2023

Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' entry. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014430750