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aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383298
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822038
This paper reports on experiments regarding cheap talk games where senders attempt deception when their interests are not in conflict with those of the receiver. The amount of miscommunication is higher than in previous experimental findings on cheap talk games in situations where senders’ and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418635
This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors ́choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a "delegation-scheme." Conversely, project...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199746
" consists of unverifiable information and the quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126407
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009153832
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130
We propose that multinational firms learn about their profitability in a particular market by observing their performance in nearby markets. We first develop a model of firm expectations formation with noisy signals from multiple markets and derive predictions on expectations formation and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012258595
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their … customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown … situation in which experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012315945
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301085