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For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496962
, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex post. Based on the buyer's expectation management, our theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256140
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long … ; incomplete contracts ; reference points ; employment contracts ; behavioral contract theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009687212
in line with the predictions of our theory. In particular, we find that the share of short-term collaborations is higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754216
A manufacturer's incentives to undertake non-contractible investments depend on the profit margin on her sales to the retailer, and slotting allowances can facilitate such incentives by increasing unit wholesale prices. At first glance, it is tempting to conclude that slotting allowances should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003751122
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003910453
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009765519
Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011447525
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781529