Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 5,400
Cover Image
Strategic interaction in the market for physician services : the treadmill effect in a fixed budget system
Benstetter, Franz; Wambach, Achim - 2001
We examine the strategic interaction in the market for physician services when the total budget for reimbursement is fixed. We show that this prospective payment system involves { compared to a fee-for-service remuneration system { a severe coordination problem, which potentially leads to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398025
Cover Image
Contractual and organizational structure with reciprocal agents
Englmaier, Florian (contributor);  … - 2008
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003763282
Cover Image
Self-confidence and reactions to subjective performance evaluations
Bellemare, Charles; Sebald, Alexander - 2018
Subjective performance evaluations are commonly used to provide feedback and incentives to workers. However, such evaluations can generate significant disagreements and conflicts, the severity of which may be driven by many factors. In this paper we show that a workers' level of self-confidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011927889
Cover Image
Health service gatekeepers
Malcomson, James - 2003
Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too weak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011511048
Cover Image
Does your doctor matter? : doctor quality and patient outcomes
Ginja, Rita; Riise Kolstad, Julie; Willage, Barton; … - 2022
there is substantial variation in the quality of physicians, as measured by patients' post-assignment mortality, in the … point decline in a patient's two-year mortality risk. While we find evidence of observable doctor characteristics and …-quality doctors are, and that patient-generated GP ratings are uncorrelated with GP value-added. Using a lower bound of the predicted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255868
Cover Image
Selling reputation when going out of business : presented at CEFifo Area Conference on Industrial Organisation, March 2004
Hakenes, Hendrik; Peitz, Martin - CESifo Area Conference on Industrial Organisation … - 2004
profits, bid for the firms on sale. Customers are concerned with the owners' type, which reflects the quality of the good or … his past experience was good. However, we show that, in equilibrium, customers believe that also the new owner is of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449475
Cover Image
Genetic testing and repulsion from chance
Hoel, Michael; Iversen, Tor; Nilssen, Tore; Vislie, Jon - 2004
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person s well-being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402443
Cover Image
Insurance in a market for credence goods
Sülzle, Kai; Wambach, Achim - 2002
We study the impact of insurance on the amount of fraud in a physician-patient relationship. In a market for credence … goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage …, physicians have an incentive to cheat by inducing inappropriate treatment levels. It is shown that a higher coinsurance rate may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409200
Cover Image
Market competition and lower tier incentives
Theilen, Bernd (contributor) - 2008
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm’s hierarchy. In this paper, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003790640
Cover Image
Flexible contracts
Gottardi, Piero; Tallon, Jean-Marc; Ghirardato, Paolo - 2010
This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936681