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Immigration control-related audits and their resulting sanctions are not solely determined by impartial enforcement of laws and regulations. They are also determined by the incentives faced by vote-maximizing congressmen, agents acting on their behalf, and workers likely to compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533971
Provided that the literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is overall inconclusive, the fact that individual authors persistently claim to have found solid evidence in one or the other direction raises two questions. Firstly, what are the causes for these different results? Do...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722413
penalty to the severity of the crime. We combine individual-level data on sentence length for a representative sample of US …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011723411
Criminal law enforcement depends on the actions of public agents such as police officers, but the resulting agency problems have been neglected in the law and economics literature (especially outside the specific context of corruption). We develop an agency model of police behavior that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509622
The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120376
Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in … their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com …- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011956277
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256706
can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003364565
Consumption risk sharing among U.S. federal states increases in booms and decreases in recessions. We find that small firms' access to credit markets plays an important role in explaining this stylized fact: business cycle fluctuations in aggregate risk sharing are more pronounced in states in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003807913